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IN THE SU-PREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.J. \Y. EDG;\R, a,1 lda .Jiiii EDGAR 
alld E \"EL 1rN EDGAR, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and 1-lespondents~ 
vs. 
CO~IBINED PRODUCTION AS-
SOCl/tTES, LTD., a Utah Corpo-
ration, Defendant and .A.ppellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Civil No. 
10159 
ST ... \TE~IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for specific performance of an 
alleged contract between the plaintiffs and the defend-
ant. involving the sale of three unpatented mining 
claims. 
DISPOSITION OF LO"\VER COURT 
This case was tried to the court at a pre-trial hear-
ing. Frmn the summary judgment for the plaintiffs, 
defendant appeals. 
.) 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPE1\.L 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judg1nent in faYor 
of the plaintiffs and seeks judgment in its favor as a 
matter of law, or that failing, a trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs brought this action to enforce the 
document attached to plaintiffs' complaint and desig-
nated as Exhibit "A", to wit: 
"Dec. 9 - 1962. Dear Ji1n Edgar & Evelyn 
Edgar: In consideration of your signing that 
document titled Amendment to Mining Lease & 
Options, I will retbl!n you the $9000 note of 
Combined Productic;-n Associates personally en-
dorsed, due on June 15th, 1963 and at 
that time you are to assign me your Blue Star 
interest as evidenced by your contract. I sl Com-
bined Production Associates, Ltd., A. B. 
Thomas- Pres. 
"The position of Blue Star, Blue Star No. 1 
& Blue Star No. 2 - accepted by '""· E. Edgar, 
'Villas L. Edgar & M. M. Edgar - is acceptable 
to Combined Production Associates for the pur-
pose of the contract on the ground titled "Amend-
ment to Lease & Options". Is/ Combined Produc-
tion Associates, A. B. Thomas- Pres." (R. 2A). 
It appears from the pleadings, the answer to inter-
rogatories and from the statements made at the pre-
trial hearing, that the mining claims in this suit, together 
with a number of other claims owned by other parties, 
were originally leased to M M & S Exploration Com-
4 
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pany in .June, lD;')!l, and the lease was assigned to the 
defendant. 
The majority of the claims are owned by a family 
ktHJ\\'ll as the :Edgars, and a dispute arose among them 
a.'> to the lol'ation of the various claims in reference to 
an ore body. Each owner "floated" his claim so that 
caeh daitned the ownership of the mining claim upon 
whieh the ore body was located. This dispute resulted 
in a typil'al western claim-jumping fight, where threats 
of force and violence and an exhibition of guns and 
threats to use the same were demonstrated against the 
lessee. 
To settle the status of these claims, an amendment 
to this lease was drawn and circulated among the owners 
for their signa tt1res. The amended agreement provided, 
"\\'hereas certain confusion exists in the location of the 
respective groups of claims which cloud the title to said 
elaims, . . . it is the desire of all parties to execute a 
lease ... which will effectively protect said title." Article 
XII provided: 
XII 
CO,TEN 1-\.NT AS TO ADVERSE CLAIMS 
AND STATUS OF TITLE 
P .. :\RCEL I: 
The parties hereto acknowledge that a dispute 
has arisen between the First Parties and the 
Second Parties as to the location of the claims 
described in Parcel I, which affects the owner-
ship of Parcel II. Prior to 45 days from date 
5 
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hereof, First Parties and Second Parties agree 
to settle their differences and designate in writing 
and by plat the agreed locations of the clain1s 
described in Parcel I. As of such date, First 
Parties and Second Parties covenant that the 
persons then designated by them will be the sole 
owners of the mining claims set forth in Parcel I, 
subject only to the following: 
The paramount title of the United States 
and any cloud on the title which may have been 
created by Third Parties. 
PARCEL II: 
As of the date designated in Parcel I, the I1..,irst 
Parties and Secqnd Parties shall designate in 
writing and by plat the agreed locations of the 
claims described in Parcel II. As of such date, 
First and Second Parties covenant that the per-
sons designated by them will be the sole owners 
of the mining claims set forth in Parcel II, sub-
ject only to the following: 
The paramount title of the United States 
and any cloud on the title which may have been 
created by Third Parties. (R. 9). 
At the time defendant approached the plaintiffs 
for their signatures on the amended lease, all the parties 
to the amended lease signed the lease and a pia t showing 
the location of the claims in which each lessor had an 
interest with the exception of Travis Edgar and his 
wife. After a discussion between the plaintiffs and A. B. 
Thmnas, president of the defendant company, the plain-
tiffs agreed to sell their interest in the claims for $10,-
000.00, and the defendant agreed to buy these claims 
6 
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i'or said sum. if the :unended lease and plat was signed 
hr Travis Edgar and his wife. The memorandum Ex-
hibit--~\" supra was signed and the defendant delivered 
a l'hcl'k for $1,000.00 to the plaintiffs, with the under-
standing that it would not be cashed until Travis Edgar 
and his wife had signed the amended lease and plat. 
( l )lat H. 10). These discussions between the plaintiffs 
and the president of the defendant company took place 
itt .A. pache Junction, Arizona. Mr. Thomas returned to 
Salt Lake City and sent one Robert Morris, a resident 
of Elko, Nevada, to see Travis Edgar and his wife, who 
resided at Albuquerque, New Mexico, to sign the 
amended lease and plat. 
~Ir. Thomas sent the following telegram to the 
plaintiffs: 
''Thanks for everything. Morris leaves this 
afternoon for Albuquerque. Check and note will 
be good the 1ninute Travis signs, which should 
be tmnorrow. \Vill work hard for a pay out to 
you long before June 15th." (R. II). 
~I orris was caught in a snow storm in New Mexico 
and did not return to Salt Lake City with the documents, 
but went by bus to his home in Elko. He notified Mr. 
Thomas that Travis Edgar had signed, but he neglected 
to state that Travis Edgar and his wife had refused to 
sign the plat. Mr. Thomas, believing that both docu-
ments had been signed by Travis Edgar and his wife, 
sent plaintiffs the following telegram: 
"Travis has signed. Deposit check, note will 
reach you in few days." (R. 12). 
7 
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A few days later, ~Ir. Thmnas learned fron1 ~'lr. 
l\1orris that the plat had not been signed. 1\Ir. Thoula:-i 
telephoned this information to the plaintiffs, "vho, in 
the meantime, had cashed the $1,000.00 check, and 
requested the return of the money. The plaintiffs re-
fused to refund the money, claiming it as a pay1nent 
for the trouble they had gone. to in this matter and for 
trips they had made to the property. 
The plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action 
and at a pre-trial hearing the court entered a sumrnary 
judgment against the defendant for the sum of 
$9,000.00, plus interest and costs. The plaintiffs had 
promised to insert in the findings and judgment that 
upon payment of this sum, the defendant would be 
entitled to a deed of the claims owned by the plaintiffs. 
( R. 33-4) . This was not done and an ordinary j udg-
ment for damages has been entered against the defend-
ant for the sum of $9,738.70, although the action was 
based upon a contract for the sale of three 1nining 
claims. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANT-
ING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANT. 
The contract upon which this suit is based, to 1vit, 
Exhibit "A", without oral evidence is ambiguous, un-
certain and unintelligent and, therefore, unenforceable. 
8 
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.Assuming that Exhibit ".1\'' is a binding obligation 
between the plaintiffs and the defendant, the perfol'ln-
alll'e of said ~ontract \vas contingent upon the signing 
of the alllcnded lease and plat by Travis Edgar and his 
wife. The second paragraph of Exhibit "A" states: 
"The position of the Blue Star, Blue Star No. 1 and 
Blue Star No. 2 accepted by W. E. Edgar, 'Villis L. 
I~:dgar and J. ~1. Edgar is acceptable to Combined 
Production i\._ssociates ... " This language indicates 
that the defendant was concer.p.ed about the location 
1lf lhe three mining claims. The telegram attached to 
the pleadings, Exhibit 2, clearly indicates that the pur-
chase of the daims was based upon securing the signa-
lures of Travis Edgar and his wife. When Thomas sent 
the telegrmn, Exhibit 2, to the plaintiffs and stated: 
"l\Iorris leaves this afternoon for Albuquerque. Check 
and note will be good the minute signed, which should 
be tomorrow ... ",and on December 15, 1962, another 
telegram was sent to the plaintiffs, Exhibit 3, which 
stated: ··'TraYis has signed. Deposit check. Note will 
reach you within a few days," indicates that there was 
no deal until the signatures of Travis Edgar and his 
wife were secured. The check was cashed on December 
19. 19()2. The plaintiffs clearly understood after they 
had signed the amendment to the lease that it was 
necessar~- that the various owners of the claims settle 
their differences within 45 days after the signing of 
said amendrnent. This is supported by Article XII, 
which, muong other things, states: "That prior to 45 
da~-s frorn date hereof, First Parties and Second Parties 
9 
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agree to settle their differences and designate in writing 
and by plat the agreed locations of the clai1ns ... ''. 
This agreement has never been fulfilled by the owners 
of the claims, nor have all of the owners of the clai1ns 
signed the plat agreeing to the location of the claims. 
That it was the understanding and the intention of 
the parties that Exhibit "B" was not a binding agree-
ment until Travis Edgar had signed the plat is ad1nitted 
by the plaintiffs in their answer to interrogatories. De-
fendants propounded the following interrogatory: 
"5. Is it not a fact that the alleged contract 
Exhibit "A" attached to your complaint was 
contingent upon all the owners of the Blue Star 
claims settling within 45 days their differences 
and designate in writing and by plat the agreed 
locations of the Blue Star claims?" (R. 6). 
Answer: 
"5. In answer toN o. 5-N o. It was contingent 
only upon Travis Edgar approving the plat, lo-
cating the mining claims. Later on, Defendant, 
Thomas, represented in his telegrmn (a copy of 
which has been attached as an Exhibit to Plain-
tiffs' Answer to Request for More Definite 
Statement), that Travis Edgar had signed." 
(R. 10). 
We do not believe that any reasonable person 
woudl agree to pay $10,000.00 for three unpatented 
mining claims without knowing where they were located. 
The defendant did not have an opportunity to present 
to the Judge at the pre-trial conference the facts and 
circumstances surrounding this agreement, nor was it 
10 
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ullowed to present any oral testimony to explain Ex-
hibit "A_'' and the intention of the parties concerning 
the same . 
.As lhe evidence now stands, the summary judg-
mcll t for the plaintiffs cannot stand and the same should 
be set aside and judgment of dismissal should be en-
tered in fa ,·or of the defendant. 
POINT ~. THAT PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE 
OF ACTION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE 
OF FRAUDS AND U'NENFORCEABLE FOR 
LACK OF MUTUALITY. 
The contract upon which plaintiffs' cause of action 
is based has never been signed by the plaintiffs. There 
is no evidence of any kind, oral or written, in the records 
that plaintiffs, at the time of the delivery of Exhibit 
··.A'' by Thomas to them, were legally bound to perform 
on their part. In other words, there is a lack of mutuality 
and specifiic performance should not be granted where 
the vendor is not bound by the contract. 
Plaintiffs' action is barred by the Statute of Frauds 
because the contract was not signed by the plaintiffs, 
the parties making the sale. 
)fining claims are deemed to be real estate and 
subject to statute of frauds; 37 C.J.S. para. 83, p. 588. 
In 25-5-3, U.C.A. 1953, relating to leases and 
contracts for interest in lands, it is provided: 
11 
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"Every contract for the leasing for a longer 
period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, 
or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the 
contract, or some note or 1ne1noranduin thereof, 
is in writing subscribed by the party by ~whmn 
the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful 
agent thereunto authorized in writing." 
In 37 C.J.S., page 699, it is stated: 
"In a number of jurisdictions the statute re-
lating to contracts for the sale of land expressly 
requires the signing by, and only by, the party 
making the sale." 
A vendor who has not signed a contract or a meino-
randum or the contract of sale cannot enforce the con-
tract against the purchaser; Clark vs. Holrnan~ 170 
N.W. 23; Ducett vs. Wolf~ 45 N.W. 829; Maynard vs. 
Brown~ 2 N.W. 30. The above are Michigan cases. 
The rule is also held in Kentucky, see [(latch vs. 
Simpson~ 34 S.W. 2d 95; Smith vs. Ballou~ 277 S.W. 
286. 
The rule is also supported In Tennessee; Ashley 
vs. Preston~ 39 S.W. 2d., 279. 
In 49 Am. J ur. 383, it is stated: 
"In some instances, the statutes require leases 
or contracts for the sale of an interest in land to 
be signed by the party by whom the lease or sale 
is made, leaving the contract so signed binding 
on the lessee or purchaser, although not signed 
by him, but not binding on either party unless 
signed by the vendor.'' 
12 
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In Bailey 'l'.V. Leishman, 32 Utah 128, 89 Pac. 78, 
a suit was on the contract for the sale of seed signed by 
sellers. The court in its application of the statutes of 
fraud, states: 
"'I'he requiretnent to subscribe or sign the 
Inetnorandutn is purely statutory and our statute 
requires that the party to be charged only ne~d 
subscribe. This, it has often been held, applies 
to the vendor in case of sale. The weight of 
authority is clf<\lrly to this effect." 
In 1l! oen vs. IJ{inzel, Idaho, 313 Pac. 2nd 1079, 
upholds the rule that the contract to be enforceable 
must be signed by the vendor. 
In Steel vs. Duntley, 1 Pac. 2d 999, California, the 
:1ppellant con1plained that the contract was not signed 
by the \'endee and was within the statute of frauds. The 
court stated: 
"This is not the requirement of the law. The 
party to be charged is the only one who must 
sign, and in the situation before us, that is the 
vendor who did sign." 
POI~T 3. THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED 
TO TENDER A DEED TO THE CLAIMS OR 
SHOlV O'YNERSHIP OF THE CLAIMS AT 
THE TI~IE OF THE HEARING . 
.. ..-\ .. n action to recover the purchase price is a substi-
tute for a bill to enforce specific performance for the 
sale of the land. There is no evidence that the plaintiffs 
owned the 1nining claims at the time of the pre-trial 
13 
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hearing, either by abstract of title or by oral testi;nony. 
No deed or conveyance to said claims has been tendered 
or offered. The judgment against the defendant did 
not provide therein that upon payment of the judgrnent 
defendant would be entitled to conveyance of the min" 
ing claims. If defendant pays the judgment, it gets 
no interest or ownership in these claims. Under the 
present proce edings, the plaintiffs can recover judg-
ment for $9,738.70 and still keep the clairns. 
In 92 C.J.S., page 449, it is stated: 
"An action at law by the vendor for the unpaid 
purchase price of an executory contract of sale 
is in effect an action for specific performance of 
the contract, and should therefore be governed 
by the same equitable principles." 
In 92 C.J.S., page 457, it is stated: 
"Where the covenants as to the payment of the 
purchase price or a portion thereof, and as to the 
conveyance of the title, are mutual and depend" 
ent, the vendor cannot maintain an action for 
the purchase price without first conveying or 
tendering a deed, or offering to do so, or, in juris-
dictions -where that is a sufficient tender, allege 
a readiness and willingness to perform, as dis" 
cussed infra 481 ; and if the purchaser dies dur-
ing the continuance of such contract the tender 
rnust be made to his heirs. Thus, a delivery or 
tender of a deed must be made as a condition to 
the right to recover purchase rnoney due where 
the conveyance and payment are to be made at 
the same time, as where the vendor agrees to 
convey on payment of the purchase price or a 
14 
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portion thereof. Where the vendor binds ~ims~lf 
to make a deed when the purchaser requires It, 
and after the whole of the purchase money falls 
due the purchaser offers to pay it, and demands · 
a deed, the vendor cannot maintain an action for 
the money without having tendered a proper 
conveyance." 
In Stct,cns vs. Irwin~ 231 Pacfic, 783, it is stated: 
"The rule seems to be that a vendor under an 
executory contract of sale may maintain an ac-
tion for the purchase price, but where his suit is 
for all of the balance of the purchase price he 
must offer to perform the obligations iinposed 
upon him by tendering and bringing into court 
a deed of conveyance to the property, because the 
vendor is not entitled to have both the land and 
a judgment for the purchase price." 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion Appellant submits that the lower 
court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor 
of the plaintiffs and the judgment of the trial court 
should be reversed and the case dismissed. 
Respectfully ~ubmitted, 
H. G. METOS 
Attorney for Appellant 
404 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
15 
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